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FIGHTING HIV/AIDS: RECONFIGURING THE STATE? 
 
SOPHIE HARMAN 
 
$10 billion goes to fight HIV/AIDS annually. This money has been accompanied by the introduction of quasi-
governmental bodies, a mushrooming of civil society actors and high-level political commitments of states and 
international agencies. This paper argues that the multiplicity of actors involved in the HIV/AIDS response, 
their competing demands and desired outcomes has led to a re-modelling of the state in East Africa. Moreover, 
this re-modelling does not exist in isolation of wider trends within the global political economy, but is instead 
led by the World Bank as part of its wider governance reform agenda in which notions of sovereignty and 
partnership are challenged under the rubric of ownership. The paper considers the role of the National AIDS 
Council, the President, Civil Society and the Ministry of Health in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda within the 
World Bank’s Multi-Country AIDS Programme to explore this relationship. 
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According to received wisdom from academic research and the international community, 
effective responses to the HIV/AIDS crisis in sub-Saharan Africa rest on the role of the 
state. States have been identified as the main leaders and managers of HIV/AIDS 
programmes, and have been sought by donors and international organisations to accept and 
internalise dominant approaches to responding to this crisis. What is of concern, however, is 
that this over-arching emphasis is not initiated by the individual governments themselves, 
but is donor-led and donor-designed, specifically by the World Bank. Understandings of the 
state and HIV/AIDS focus upon the socio-economic impact of the epidemic, whilst failing 
to consider the effect of the international financial commitments and organisations that have 
come to form the global response and wider constructions of governance reform that the 
response operates within. This paper argues that through its Multi-Country AIDS 
Programme (MAP), the Bank has operationalised the reform measures it prioritised in the 
mid-1990s. This has confronted issues of state sovereignty within Kenya, Tanzania and 
Uganda, and due to the global nature of the epidemic, and the Bank’s role within it, set the 
foundations for wider absorption of the Bank’s particular form of governance reform 
through decentralised delivery mechanisms. To understand the inter-relationship between 
the HIV/AIDS epidemic and the state, it is crucial to unravel the role of the World Bank. 
 
The paper proceeds in the following manner. First, the paper considers current debate 
surrounding HIV/AIDS interventions and the state. Second, the paper outlines how 
directives by international organisations have placed the role of the state at the centre of 
HIV/AIDS responses. The paper then considers how the Bank’s HIV/AIDS interventions 
fit within the wider governance reform projects of the 1990s, and the relationship between 
existing research on such reform and the MAP. Fourth, the paper explores the impact of the 
response upon the role of the National AIDS Councils (NACs), the Ministries of Health, 
and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs). The paper’s main findings and contributions are 
then drawn together in conclusion.1  
 
What We know about the State and AIDS 
Questions of the impact of HIV/AIDS upon the state are not new. Research into the socio-
economic measures and outcomes of the epidemic raise concerns over the capacity of states 
to address HIV/AIDS. Capacity in this instance has mainly referred to the money and 
political commitments needed to ensure widespread healthcare provision. The ability of 
states to address these issues has been undermined by a number of factors. First, state 
infrastructure is weak where a high death rate of state workers or civil servants exists 
(Barnett and Whiteside, 2002; Chirambo, 2007; deWaal, 2003). Death in this instance 
reduces government consistency and experience, and leads to under-staffing. Moreover, 
death of elected officials undermines democratic practice and the realisation of long term 
strategic plans in combating the epidemic (Chirambo, 2007). 
 
Second, countries with high HIV/AIDS prevalence rates are often poor ‘fractured societies’ 
(Poku and Sandkjner, 2007) with weak state infrastructure and often lacking in the financial 
resources to provide healthcare for all. As Whiteside argues, state capacity in healthcare 
provision has been weakened by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank 
structural adjustment policies of the 1980s and early 1990s, which opened provision to the 
                                            
1 The main findings of the paper are based upon research into the activities of the World Bank’s Multi-Country 
AIDS Program (MAP) in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda from 2004-2007. This research consisted of 163 semi-
structured interviews with government officials, the Bank, multilateral and bilateral agencies and donors, and 
CSOs; 50 issued questionnaires, participant observation of community meetings and partnership forums.  
 
market and thus reduced state intervention in basic services (Whiteside, 2002), exacerbated 
poverty, reduced budgetary spending on health, and thus undermining the capacity of 
African governments to deal with the HIV/AIDS epidemic (Peet, 2003, 141). Health care 
and education structures have been weakened through the transfer of resources from 
African countries in the form of $13.5 billion in debt per year (Cheru, 2002, 300 & 303). 
Export promotion and debt repayment resulted in cuts in public welfare spending. The 
impact of debt burden and structural adjustment has seen a shift away from approaches to 
health that were based upon social justice and equity in provision to approaches that view 
such provision as a threat to public finances and therefore not productive for human 
development and economic growth (Poku, 2002, 531; Whiteside, 2002, 191-192). 
Conditionalities placed on countries that received structural adjustment loans have framed 
the welfare systems of countries that are now tackling high HIV/AIDS prevalence levels, 
and, as a result, the majority of such countries suffer from under-staffed and under-funded 
health systems (Schoepf et al, 2000, 108).  
 
Third, high death rates of people of working age, affects countries’ labour productivity and 
position within global knowledge economies. This particularly impacts upon small business 
and micro-enterprise as a tool of poverty reduction that bear the cost of this high prevalence 
rate (Poku and Sandkjaer, 2007). Productivity is reduced as absenteeism through sickness 
increases, people die, recruitment and training costs increase, and investors lack incentive to 
commit funds to countries where HIV/AIDS compromise returns (Barnett & Whiteside, 
2002, 242). Thus, global corporations lack incentive to invest in countries with high 
prevalence levels, and job opportunities within the global economy are reduced, and the 
cycle of poverty continues. This is compounded by a ‘brain drain’ of highly skilled workers 
from developing countries with high rates of HIV/AIDS that travel abroad for better wages.  
 
Both despite and because of these factors, academic emphasis upon the role of government 
and the state in leading the response to HIV/AIDS remains (Poku, 2001; Barnett and 
Whiteside, 2002). The role of the government is crucial as only they can put HIV/AIDS at 
the centre of the national agenda; create favourable conditions for other actors to play their 
role; and protect the poor and vulnerable (Poku, 2001, 199).  Lack of government ownership 
and response to their individual country’s crisis sets a model for people, who believe that if 
the government is not taking the epidemic seriously then neither should they; doubts are 
subsequently reinforced, and stigma and misunderstanding continues (Caldwell & Caldwell, 
1992, 1179). This emphasis has been met by a series of incentives by international 
organisations such as the United Nations (UN) and World Bank to place states, or more 
particularly governments, at the centre of the HIV/AIDS response.  
 
The role of government became the nucleus of HIV/AIDS activity during the late 1990s and 
early 2000s. This was in part reaction to evidence from countries such as Brazil and Uganda 
that were deemed ‘success stories’ by the international development community in their 
handling of the epidemic (Int. Garrison, 27th April 2006). A, if not the, key component of 
their success was the role governments - and crucially Presidents - took in speaking out 
about HIV/AIDS. Up to this point, the central focus of the HIV/AIDS response was 
concerned with the biomedical side of the epidemic, with the World Health Organisation’s 
(WHO) Global Programme on AIDS (GPA) concentrating upon a health response, ignoring 
the social side affects until they themselves became costly health problems (Ankrah, 1991, 
967 & 973). The role of government and the state became a part of the agenda with the 
creation of the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), and efforts led 
by the UN to co-ordinate all state and international structures to address the socio-economic 
causes and consequences of the epidemic. However, it was not until the World Bank 
recognised this issue and built a project of unprecedented financial magnitude and scope that 
the role of the state and the impact of the global response upon it, came to the fore.  
 
The Bank established its US$1billion Multi-Country AIDS Program (MAP) commitment to 
fighting HIV/AIDS in early 2000. The purpose of the MAP was to make funds available for 
any country in sub-Saharan Africa with a high HIV/AIDS prevalence rate and to engender a 
widespread ‘multi-sectoral’ response to the epidemic that involved every aspect of state and 
society. As such, funds were made available to those states that would accept and commit to 
the following conditions: presence of a national strategic plan to fight HIV/AIDS; a national 
co-ordinating body; a commitment to directing 40-60 per cent of funds to CSOs and 
agreement by the government to use multiple implementation agencies, especially national 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and community groups. Key to the MAP’s 
intervention was the role of governments and the state, and to reflect this role the Bank 
implemented National AIDS Councils (NACs) in the highest political office of each of the 
28 countries that have received MAP funding. These authorities were to co-ordinate the 
national response, select CSOs appropriate for funding, and implement the Bank’s project 
(World Bank, 2007). The MAP was the first project of its kind to establish governmental 
structures and promote the inclusion of CSOs. Since its inception, the MAP’s commitment 
to state responses and multi-sectoralism has come to underpin and lead the global response 
to HIV/AIDS (Harman, 2007). 
 
Understood against research into HIV/AIDS interventions and governance of the epidemic, 
the prioritisation of the state appears a straightforward necessity to a problem that requires 
strong governmental leadership. What is not clear, however, is the impact these globally-
designed state-led initiatives are having upon the government and the state, particularly in 
sub-Saharan Africa, or how this prioritisation of the state fits into the wider governance 
reform agenda of the World Bank. Research on the Bank’s governance reform of the mid-
1990s suggests that interventions under the rubric of ‘the fight against AIDS’ do not exist in 
isolation of such reform.  
 
Structural adjustment programmes of the 1980s and early 1990s sought to reduce the role of 
the state as a stumbling block to stringent neoliberalism. Since 1990, international financial 
institutions such as the World Bank have come to see the state as a central vehicle in which 
to promote market based reforms. This shift in thinking has been attributed to 
developments in economic thinking (Berlotti and Perotti, 2007), wider Bank commitments 
to governance reform (Tuozzo, 2004), and the logic that economic reform can only occur 
through social development (Griffin, 2006, 574). The Bank’s approach to governance reform 
is based upon capital and efficiency in public sector management, rule of law, accountability 
and transparency impacted on states in various ways (Harrison, 2005; Tuozzo, 2004; World 
Bank, 1994). As Williams describes it, the Bank became engaged in ‘detailed and intrusive 
activities’ in countries in the pursuit of establishing market-based systems (Williams, 1999, 
80). Berlotti and Perotti suggest that through such reform the state encompassed a form of 
‘residual ownership’ wherein it adopted responsibility or ‘ownership’ of national programmes 
and priorities but became ‘progressively removed’ from direct involvement in the economy 
(Berlotti and Perotti, 2007, 61-64). For example, in Mexico, the state’s reform agenda was 
ideationally identical to that of the Bank’s second generation reform agenda of governance, 
state ownership and civil society partnerships, encapsulated by the Comprehensive 
Development Framework and World Development Reports of the 1990s. The successful 
realisation of such reform however was limited by ‘domestic political squabbles’ where the 
managers of reform, i.e. politicians, failed to fully implement or subscribe to the Bank’s 
governance agenda (Charnock, 2006, 84-91). This example of second generation reform in 
Mexico fits with Harrison’s conception of the term.  
 
Harrison characterises the Bank’s shift from stringent ‘Washington Consensus’-typified first 
generation reform to an era of post-conditionality, second-generation reform, in which it 
operates through ‘governance states’ within the ‘sovereign frontier.’ In so doing, ‘governance 
states’ - typified by their attainment of ‘showcase status’, favourable growth rates, stability, 
‘new beginning’-styled transition, and the prominent role of finance ministries - have 
become the central vehicles in which to embed market-based governance reform within sub-
Saharan Africa (Harrison, 2004, 41 & 82-90). Harrison suggests that the Bank’s form of 
governance reform refers to the public sector’s ability to enhance economic growth 
(Harrison, 2005, 241). The Bank ‘cherry-picks’ between states with ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
governance in sub-Saharan Africa which in turns divides states as ‘good’ and ‘bad’ adjusters 
(Harrison, 2004, 76). Conditionality is presented within the context of state-ownership and 
‘development’ as a means of legitimising reforms. Sovereignty is thus being reconfigured 
through the ‘sovereign frontier’ in which it is constructed by an interplay of actors under the 
rubric of World Bank-led second generation reform (Harrison, 2004, 26). Civil Society 
Organisations (CSOs) are central to such interplay; embedding and legitimising this new 
form of governance and sovereignty and engaging in agendas set by donors (Harrison, 2004, 
97-107 &131; Harrison, 2005, 244). Similar to Charnock’s findings, Harrison suggests the 
Bank’s ability to fully enact governance reform are limited to the ahistorical and apolitical 
nature of the Bank’s conception of the state that produces short-term, quick-fix market 
solutions to historically-embedded issues (Harrison, 2005, 255). The findings of Charnock, 
Harrison, Tuozzo, and Williams are pertinent to any understanding of HIV/AIDS 
governance, and in particular the prioritisation of the state at the forefront of the global 
agenda. As this paper will demonstrate, HIV/AIDS is used as a vehicle in which the Bank 
can enact its specific market-based governance reform throughout Kenya, Tanzania and 
Uganda, and in using its HIV/AIDS interventions as a model for best practice, export its 
agenda throughout countries with high HIV prevalence.  
 
The NACs and DACs: the new armies in the war on AIDS 
National, District, Regional and Community AIDS Councils co-ordinate the national 
response to HIV/AIDS at every level of government in line with each country’s national 
strategic plan. They were established in 2000 and are a pre-requisite of any country in receipt 
of World Bank MAP funds. In keeping with the Bank’s model of governance reform that 
prioritises the executive and Ministry of Finance (Tuozzo, 2004), these AIDS councils are 
principally housed in the Office of the President, and funded through the Ministry of 
Finance. The main role of the NACs is to co-ordinate the national response to HIV/AIDS 
by identifying those CSOs that should receive funds; strengthening the District AIDS 
Councils; working with partners to articulate the strategic plan; mobilising partners and 
working with line ministries and donors in strengthening capacity and filling the gaps in the 
national response to HIV/AIDS (Int. Bahati, 14th November 2005; Int. Byenka, 11th October 
2005; Int. Kalinga, 14th February 2006; Int. Temba, 10th February 2006; Int. Tembele, 6th 
January 2006). The NACs are the main focal point of the HIV/AIDS response, and are the 
subject of much capacity building by UNAIDS and UNDP, and have, in some countries, 
accommodated the Global Fund’s central operative body – the country-co-ordinating 
mechanisms (CCMs) within their overall structure. In Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda the staff 
of the NACs take the form of ‘governance habitus’ described by Harrison, wherein they are 
dominated by similar public sector elites, using training workshops and agendas paid for by 
donor money (Harrison, 2005, 256).  
 
The ability of the NACs to enact their own form of HIV/AIDS response has been mired by 
problems of CSO mistrust, bureaucracy, corruption, capacity, direction and ownership of 
their national responses. A healthy mistrust exists between the NACs and CSOs. Interviews 
with CSOs within East Africa suggest that this mistrust is based upon specific CSOs’ views 
that the NACs are political entities conditioned by wider government spending plans and 
objectives (Int. Kalimire, 17th October 2005) or a political institution that distorts outcomes 
and achievements to make the government look successful (Int. Mwai, 29th November 2005; 
Int. Ruranga, 31st October 2005). Other CSOs interpret the actions of the NACs as directed 
by donor demands, and that for states to realise their objectives in the response to 
HIV/AIDS they must be more dynamic in the management of such demand (Int. Mwai, 29th 
November 2005). Competing demands reduce the NACs disposition to actual governance of 
community empowerment, thus reducing the already limited space for social activity that 
exists in East African society (Int. Southern, 9th January 2006). CSOs feel that mistrust could 
be better managed by CSOs through improved co-ordination (Int. Hervey, 27th January 
2006); presence within the community to gain first hand experience of the problems CSOs 
face; greater publicity of their work (Int. Ogen, 19th October 2005; Int. Kaloli, 4th January 
2006; Int. Simbaya, 7th February 2006), and the promotion of transparent funding methods to 
get rid of ‘briefcase NGOs’ (Int. Mubondo, 20th January 2006; Int. Mulimila, 19th January 
2006). These factors would minimise mistrust and as a consequence strengthen the response 
at the national level (Int. Hervey, 27th January 2006).  
 
A commonly perceived problem within state sponsored activity in sub-Saharan Africa is 
corruption. The perception of corruption presents a powerful obstacle to the effectiveness 
of the NACs. In 2005, Uganda was tarnished by the Global Fund’s withdrawal of support 
resulting from the discovery of mis-managed funds by independent auditors 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers. The Global Fund suspended all of its five grants to Uganda until 
the Ministry of Finance had established a structure that would ensure effective management 
of the funds (Global Fund, 2007). This issue has since been rectified, and the Global Fund 
was quickly re-established in the country. The Global Fund issue was minor in comparison 
to the problems experienced by the Kenyan National AIDS Council – the National AIDS 
Control Council (NACC) - and the country’s wider reputation for corruption (Int. Kinzett, 
23rd November 2005).2 Levels of misappropriation were such that national NGOs alleged the 
then Head of the NACC was reputedly paying herself KSh2million (approximately 
UK£13,500) out of MAP funds earmarked for the community (Int. Mwai, 29th November 
2005). This allegation was supported by The Lancet that revealed the total sum of Gachara’s 
financial impropriety was obtaining US$315,789 (approximately UK£157,894) in salary 
                                            
2 In 2005 Sir Edward Clay, the then UK High Commissioner to Kenya made a speech documenting the levels 
of corruption within the Kenya government, accusing the government of bribery, accounting for 8% of 
Kenya’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP), that is undermining Kenya’s economic growth and donor aid 
commitments. Such an accusation made international headlines because of the comment ‘they can hardly 
expect us not to care when their gluttony causes them to vomit all over our shoes’ (BBC News, 2004) 
 
(Siringi, 2004, 193). The corruption scandal led to all senior NACC management having to 
re-apply for their jobs, removing the NACC’s funding decision-making capability, the then 
Head of the Council being imprisoned, and an external audit conducted by 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers.  
 
The bureaucratic structures and processes within the NACs make corruption hard to detect. 
Bureaucracy complicates transparency and perceptions of NAC activity and thus does little 
to dispel CSO concerns over corruption. Upon implementation, the structures and processes 
of the NACs were cumbersome and bureaucratic (Int. Kataka, 23rd November 2005), as 
management units, they added an additional layer of bureaucracy to already complex 
government-donor relations (Int. Tayyab, 25th April 2005). The levels of day-to-day 
bureaucratic inertia range within the NACs, TACAIDS seems consistent in its processes, 
deadlines and ability to keep appointments, UAC follows a similar patter in consistency and 
transparency, yet could be problematic in terms of deadlines and appointments, however, the 
bureaucratic structures of the Kenyan NACC resemble a complex ad-hoc system of protocol 
that is seemingly without process or procedure, varying by the day. Access to information 
depends on who you engaged with in the NACC, with some individuals being open; some 
changing the necessary requirements on a daily basis, and other representatives denying any 
knowledge of individuals or previous processes.3  
 
The institutional capacity of the NACs have been marked by under-funding, lack of staff and 
a rapid accumulation of responsibility. Initially established to manage the MAP, the NACs 
now have the responsibility of bilateral basket funds, the Global Fund and co-ordinating all 
HIV/AIDS activities in-country (Int. Malangalila, 20th January 2006). International 
organisations such as UNAIDS and CSOs view this as a result of their inability to delegate 
responsibility to their partners, such as the Ministry of Health (Int. Mubondo, 20th January 
2006; Int. Tembo, 25th May 2006). Staff members within the NACs are targeted as lacking 
                                            
3 These findings are based on extensive visits to the NACC: in one instance the NACC was open to 
participation in the Joint Annual HIV/AIDS Programme Review and were extremely accommodating and 
helpful in this respect; the corollary of this was attempting to access information on the District Technical 
Committees and being told that the information i.e. names and addresses were classified without a letter of 
introduction from the British High Commission, British Council or whoever they then chose. In a separate 
incident when attending the NAC for information on the NGOs nationally funded under the MAP the 
researcher was left waiting for 6 hours after being told the person she needed was in a meeting, and then 
eventually that that person had gone home. 
the skills and ability needed to support the community and partner CSOs effectively (Int. 
Margery, 6th January 2006). Capacity issues are the responsibility, not the fault, of the NACs. 
Fault lies in the design and responsibilities placed upon them by international donors, 
principally the Bank, and CSOs arising out of the empowerment and government-ownership 
models advocated by such donors. The need for one co-ordinating body within the 
response, the rapid demands of funding disbursal, preference towards CSO funding not 
government funding, and the multiplicity of actors involved in the response, all place stress 
upon the NACs’ capacity and confuse their initial mandate. 
 
Confusion as to the NACs’ mandate exists over their role as co-ordinators of the national 
response and implementers of the MAP (Int. Malangalila, 20th January 2006; Int. Austen, 18th 
November 2005; Int. Tembo, 25th May 2006). Representatives of the NACs, the World Bank 
and UN agencies all stress that the NAC’s role is co-ordination not implementation (Int. 
Bahati, 14th December 2005; Int. Lekule, 4th January 2006). However, in articulating the 
strategic plan, selecting those CSOs to receive MAP funds, monitoring and training the 
DACs, and strengthening public sector responses, the NACs are heavily involved in 
operational implementation (Int. Lekule, 4th January 2006; Int. Tembele, 6th January 2006; Int. 
Zewdie, 3rd May 2006). The NACs present their roles as co-ordination, but on further 
enquiry admit that they have become involved – unintentionally – in implementation. This 
presents a conflict of interests, confusion, and over-burden on the part of the NACs, 
rendering them unable to do either co-ordination or implementation successfully (Int. 
Kibamba, 20th January 2006; Int. Kinzett, 23rd November 2005). As co-ordinating bodies, the 
NACs should not house projects as it contravenes their mandate. This is problematic in the 
NACs wider relations with CSOs, as in implementing the project the NACs are directly 
competing for funds with the project’s traditional implementation partners - CSOs (Int. 
Mugumya, 1st November 2005). As one CSO characterises the situation ‘how can you referee 
when you are a player?’ (Int. Mulimila, 19th January 2006).  
 
The key factor that underpins the problems surrounding NAC capacity and their mandate is 
the discrepancy over ownership. Contrary to Bank and NAC affirmations of state ownership 
of the MAP and the national strategic plans, such ownership is articulated and directed by 
the Bank and international donors. The objectives and CSO engagement structures within 
the NACs were first created by the World Bank, and have since been developed by 
international organisations and donors under the rubric of ‘capacity building’. This is evident 
in the Bank’s implementation of the MAP in East Africa. First, the Bank used the MAP to 
establish or re-craft the NACs. The UAC in Uganda technically existed previous to the MAP 
but underwent an institutional reform and is now fully funded by the Bank under MAP 
funds, the NACC in Kenya is funded by the Bank and only existed in discussion paper form 
before the MAP, and TACAIDS in Tanzania was established under the MAP but is 
supported by government funds (Int. Voetberg, 15th November 2005; Int. Okwero, 1st 
November 2005). In the UAC, for example, once work-plans were articulated they had to be 
approved by the Bank, once the CSO proposals were reviewed the UAC prepared 
recommendations for approval to the Bank, and once the MAP was accepted, the UAC had 
to sign an agreement to support CSOs (Int. Byenka, 11th October 2005). The central 
objective of the Bank was to use MAP funds to give states ‘the push that was needed’ to 
facilitate a high-level political commitment (Int. Zewdie, 3rd May 2006). Thus not only did the 
Bank use the MAP as a catalyst for the NACs inception, it promoted an agenda that 
structured NAC practice alongside Bank working principles. 
 
Upon implementation of the MAP at country-level states did not have a role in articulating 
the project’s main objectives. The Kenyan Bank team were adamant that ‘the Bank has no 
objectives behind the TWOA (total war on AIDS), it is the government, we are supporting 
the government. That’s the point, and don’t forget it’ (Int. Lagerstedt, 16th November 2005). 
The task team leader for Tanzania provided a more contradictory response to the question 
of ownership, suggesting it should be the Tanzanian government that designs the project, 
but in practice it is always the Bank, 
 
The preparation has to be with the country. Actually the project should be prepared, 
ideally it should be prepared by the government, ideally, you know, we are not 
preparing the project as a Bank, I mean this is, but in most cases you find that it is the 
Bank preparing, doing most of it, it is supposed to be the government preparing a 
project and the Bank assisting, providing you know, assisting the country to prepare a 
project, so that there is ownership of that project, right from the word go and 
throughout the implementation and even after implementation. So that is how it 
should look like but for most of the projects of the Bank you will find that because of 
the capacities of the country er, a lot is being done by the Bank. (Int. Malangalila, 20th 
January 2006). 
 
The requirement to channel 40-60 per cent of funds to CSOs was heavily resisted by the 
governments of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, who have little practice of CSO engagement 
fostered by mutual distrust and dislike (Int. Malangalila, 20th January 2006). As such, the Bank 
made states recognise the role CSOs had in the national responses to HIV/AIDS and the 
need to adopt a new approach to development work (Int. Zewdie, 3rd May 2006). The Bank 
was able to make states recognise the use of CSO and adopt suitable mechanisms of 
engagement through the promise of desperately needed funds. Hence, the imposition of the 
CSO principle and the NACs under the MAP represented stringent conditionalities. Keen to 
dispel any use of conditionality on account of its association with controversial structural 
adjustment policy, ACT Africa avoided the issue by preferring to characterise such influence 
as ‘arm twisting’ or working with NACs to ‘remind them ruthlessly’ of their role (Int. 
Mohammed, 24th April 2006).  
 
The origins, roles, and problems of the NACs reveal several key concerns over state 
sovereignty and the impact of international financial commitments and organisations upon 
the state. First, the creation of a Bank-funded governmental body at the height of political 
office, established to implement a Bank mandate, presents an unprecedented and significant 
confrontation of state boundaries within understandings of global governance. The NACs 
are characteristic of the second generation reform measures depicted Harrison and Charnock 
in which the Bank utilises government agencies to implement its reform packages through 
subscription to, and ownership of, a shared agenda. The national application of the MAP 
represents a sophisticated incarnation of such reform through its systematic use of CSOs 
and a specific form of CSO empowerment model. Second, this creation is undermining state 
objectives and government legitimacy, which ultimately threatens governments’ position 
within its electorate. The ability of state structures such as the NACs to respond to 
community concerns are bounded by the conditionalities agreed upon at the outset of donor 
funding commitments. Under the rubric of state ownership, states have to assume 
responsibility and implement what is perceived by international organisations to be in the 
state’s best interest. Third, the ahistorical and apolitical nature of the Bank has established 
the NACs in isolation of any real understanding of the state in each of the three countries 
examined or the relationship between state and civil society, as such, similar to Charnock’s 
depiction of governance reform in Mexico, ‘domestic squabbles’ have restricted the NACs 
ability to implement the Bank’s project. The desperate situation HIV/AIDS has led to, binds 
governments in a vicious cycle of dependency upon foreign aid and a loss of sovereignty that 
infers a growing legitimacy upon non-state and international interventions. This situation is 
enhanced by competition and mistrust between state agencies, and the decline of the health 
sector.  
 
Ministry of Health: the old guard 
The implementation and prioritisation of multi-sectoral approaches to HIV/AIDS with 
NACs at the centre of leading state responses has undermined the position and capacity of 
traditional state agencies, most notably, the Ministries of Health. In all three countries 
studied, the Ministry of Health provides the technical arm of the response; addressing 
medical issues of anti-retroviral therapy (ART), opportunistic infections, voluntary 
counselling and testing (VCT), prevention of mother-to-child transmission (PMTCT), 
procurement, logistics, and technical support for hospitals and health centres. Each of the 
Ministries of Health, except Uganda, have a special HIV/AIDS section: National STD and 
HIV/AIDS Control Programme (NASCOP) of Kenya; National AIDS Control Programme 
(NACP) in Tanzania; and Zanzibar AIDS Control Programme (ZACP) in Zanzibar. 
However, the global response did not consider these agencies as suitable actors in which to 
co-ordinate the response due to a commitment to non-health based responses and the 
problems faced by Ministries of Health across the region. These systems are strengthened 
with WHO technical support, resource mobilisation, training materials, and policy guidance 
(Int. Gavyole, 13th February 2006). However they remain clinically oriented with few sectoral 
ministries accepting their authority (Int. Lagertstedt, 16th November 2005). The Bank justifies 
the introduction of the NACs through the need for a regulating body that prioritised a multi-
sectoral approach to HIV/AIDS alongside the health sector dimension (Int. Lagerstedt, 16th 
November 2005).  
 
The shift in focus from a biomedical to a multi-sectoral response to HIV/AIDS resulted in a 
contention between the NACs and the Ministries of Health. This contention was in part 
based upon an overlap in implementation and an unclear delineation of roles and 
responsibilities (Int. Quiery, 31st December 2005; Int. Duolf, 4th January 2006; Int. Hervey, 
27th January 2006; Int. Tembo, 25th May 2006). A great force for contention was over who 
had ultimate authority over the national response, principally arising out of who had greater 
funds (Int. Nyantahe, 9th January 2006). In terms of authority, an anonymous representative 
of USAID in Uganda described the Ministry of Health as ‘pissed’ that they did not house the 
Uganda MAP. The conflict between these two agencies is widely recognised as problematic 
in that they do not work together generating further overlap and distrust. However, despite 
suggestion of conflict, representatives of the NACs and the Ministries of Health 
acknowledge a degree of initial animosity (Int. Lekule, 4th January 2006; Int. Chale, 10th 
January 2006; Int. Malangalila, 20th January 2006) but then consistently state their co-
operative relationship (Int. Tembele, 6th January 2006) by issuing examples of their joint 
working practices and inter-linkages between staff and committees.  
 
The division and conflict between the Ministries of Health and the NACs has been 
heightened by the arrival of the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and 
a re-medicalisation of the epidemic. PEPFAR is a pledge of US$48 billion towards care, 
treatment and prevention programmes across the world, with a focus upon rapid 
disbursement and results, that is, large commitments to the provision of anti-retroviral 
therapy (ART), and strengthening Ministry of Health capacity. The financial capacity alone 
has led the US to subsequently dominate the HIV/AIDS response. PEPFAR officially 
recognises but does not function within pre-established processes or co-ordination 
mechanisms such as the NACs, yet is does integrate system strengthening and procurement 
practices within health ministries to facilitate the widespread scaling up of anti-retroviral 
treatment. The financial commitment of PEPFAR and its shift away from the NAC 
approach assists in the schizophrenic position of governments trying to appease multiple 
international actors, whilst maintaining their own objectives and political mandates. The 
consequence of this is further division and competition of state agencies to prove their 
legitimacy not only to central government - as is often the case within line ministries wanting 
to secure parts of the state budget - but to the priorities of international donors. The decline 
of the Ministry of Health as a result of the introduction of the NACs is characteristic of the 
Bank’s governance reform, in which it promotes bodies within the executive, and stresses 
new forms of ownership as replacement to existing structures and political cultures. 
However, bilateral money and the ‘old guard’ political structures of the state promote 
competition, but not the sort the Bank wants. 
 
CSOs, the State and the Service Economy 
At the core of multi-sectoral responses to HIV/AIDS has been the role of CSOs as key 
forms of service delivery. CSOs in this regard refer to community groups of varying scale 
and size, national NGOs, regional networks, and international non-governmental 
organisations. This has led to the upsurge of civil society actors throughout sub-Saharan 
Africa, and it is the role of the government and state structures such as the National, District 
and Community AIDS Councils to monitor and facilitate their involvement. Relations 
between governments and CSOs within sub-Saharan Africa, specifically the case study 
countries, have been traditionally marked by distrust. However, under the ‘ruthless 
reminders’ of the Bank and international influence, governments not only have to reach out 
to CSOs, but accommodate them within wider state structures of health, education and the 
Office of the President. States have thus become the managers of non-state actors, mapping 
their work, sponsoring their activities, and then monitoring their interests, needs and success 
as if they were a central part of the state structure. 
 
The omnipresence of CSO groups, particularly community based organisations within sub-
Saharan Africa sees a shift in the types of economies promoted by the Bank through state 
structures. What has emerged in response to the large sums of money channelled to 
HIV/AIDS is an AIDS business, in which economies of production are shifting to service 
economies, and the establishment of CSOs as a means of profit-making activity. Profit in 
this sense does not refer to substantial capital gain, but does enable unemployed workers to 
gain a low salary, globally-inferred prestige of working in the fight against HIV/AIDS, and 
in some cases a company four-wheel drive vehicle. This vision is re-enforced and to a degree 
sanctioned by the state in the quantity of money it directs to this service economy, and the 
form of ‘residual ownership’ adopted by the state in which basic services are provided for by 
the CSO-led private sector.  
 
 
 
Conclusion: What does this mean for the state? 
The impact of the HIV/AIDS response upon changes in government, state structures and 
sovereign boundaries confronts both how this dynamic is important to understanding the 
governance of HIV/AIDS and its implications, and the need to consider the unprecedented 
nature of this financial and global political commitment when attempting to make any 
theoretical conception of the state in sub-Saharan Africa. HIV/AIDS is only one aspect of 
government activity, and thus to talk of reconfiguration may be rash. However, the epidemic 
reveals a complex picture of the interventions of international financial institutions and the 
paradox between state ownership and conditionality under the World Bank’s governance 
reform agenda. The MAP is a clear example of the implementation of the World Bank’s 
governance reform agenda through a specific social policy that by its very nature as a multi-
sectoral public health issue has wider ramifications for the state and CSOs. However, the 
success of the project is limited by the ahistorical and apolitical underpinnings of it. The 
Bank’s approach was apolitical and ahistorical in the application of a blueprint model that 
ensured: (i) the establishment of the NACs whilst ignoring pre-existing structures within the 
Ministry of Health and potential tensions within the internal bureaucracies of these 
countries; (ii) the requirement of national and district state agencies to engage with CSOs 
despite longstanding mutual distrust; and (iii) crucially ignoring or obfuscating the socio-
economic and historical determinants of each of the countries’ HIV/AIDS epidemic. These 
factors have ultimately limited the ability of the HIV/AIDS response to fully shift the 
dynamic of state activity as divisions within the state, between the state and CSOs, or 
‘domestic squabbles’ (Charnock, 2006) reduce its wider absorption.  
 
The multi-sectoral approach to combating HIV/AIDS led by the World Bank, adopted by 
the international community, and articulated as the global response, is having the following 
affects on the state in sub-Saharan Africa. First, the need to prioritise HIV/AIDS as an 
emergency and as a development project has given international organisations license to 
transcend sovereign boundaries and establish agents of international organisations within the 
state structure. The originality and scope of the MAP as a rapid response to a development 
emergency combined with the acquiescence of states in need to the multi-sectoral agenda 
confers legitimacy onto the Bank and the types of interventions it prioritises. Second, this 
‘legitimate’ transcendence of state boundaries has been extended to the community level, 
with CSOs becoming intertwined with the service sector aspect of state provision. Similar to 
states, these actors internalise and promote the logic of the Bank whilst assuming ownership 
of the project at the local level. As such these actors promote and internalise the initiatives 
of international organisations and donors, once more under the justification of the 
HIV/AIDS emergency. It is the involvement of these national NGOs and community 
groups that offer the main contribution to how we can understand governance and state 
reform in the context of the World Bank. 
 
The positioning of CSOs at the centre of the MAP reveals a systematic extension of 
governance reform on the part of the Bank. The Bank is very candid in this, freely 
expressing the need for the involvement of these actors to ensure mechanisms of good 
governance, i.e. transparency, accountability and participation in government processes and 
decision-making. As critical understandings of governance reform would suggest, these 
actors perform a central function in embedding Bank-led reforms within states. However, in 
the context of HIV/AIDS, in performing this function, these actors play a more crucial role 
in the governance agenda of the Bank. CSOs provide an outlet for the Bank to address any 
‘bad reform’ within a state. Where governments fail to fully implement specific reform 
strategies, or are mired by internal disagreement, NGOs and community groups are targeted 
by the Bank to provide the following vital functions: service delivery, transmission of good 
reform to the community, and pressure on the state for wider reform. This pressure on the 
state is not exerted through popular protest, campaigns and lobbying, but through 
competition for funds and legitimacy as good reformers. Where the state fails to comply 
with reform measures, funds are channelled to the community or NGO sector, on the 
legitimate grounds of people infected or affected by HIV/AIDS needing the resources. 
What we see then is an extension of post-conditionality that not only internalises governance 
reform practices and Bank ideology within the state and civil society; but the funding of civil 
society that operates as competition for who can demonstrate the most ‘good’ reform. CSOs 
are thus used as means of circumventing or addressing failures within the state to fully 
reform. The ‘sovereign frontier’ thus becomes challenged at the state and community level 
of governance.  
 
The role of NGOs and community groups in transferring ‘good’ reform to decentralised 
parts of the state not only presents a new battleground within the ‘sovereign frontier’ but 
further embeds market-oriented social policy at the community level. The funding of these 
CSOs through the MAP is organised in such a way as to promote the Bank’s brand of 
accountability and legitimacy – holding the state as owners of the project to account – and 
limiting any emancipatory function of these groups in targeting the wider mechanisms of the 
MAP or the Bank itself. Civil society within this category is thus organised by funding, and 
market logic of competition for funds as a means of promoting efficiency, and low cost 
delivery. The wrong kind of advocacy, questioning the main structures of the global 
HIV/AIDS response suggests ‘bad’ reform and thus limits the direction of funds towards 
these ‘bad’ groups.  
 
HIV/AIDS represents a new frontier for the Bank in which it can extend its governance 
reform agenda through healthcare and gain access to the most remote aspects of society 
through initiatives sanctioned and promoted by the state. The Bank’s role in HIV/AIDS 
contributes to our understanding of governance reform in unravelling the practical nuances 
of implementing such reform, the role of CSOs and their position within state reform, and 
the global reach and disciplinarity of the Bank’s reform agenda. The difficulties of 
implementing the MAP highlight the practical blockages associated with a reform agenda 
that promotes a specific form of ahistorical and apolitical governance. Nationally-based 
CSOs play a crucial role within the Bank’s agenda to circumvent or address arising blockages 
or problems of ‘bad’ reform within the state. Thus in extending governance reform beyond 
the government-focused approach to state reform to include CSOs, the Bank is not only 
embedding its liberal reform agenda of competition-based free market-led interventions at 
every level of governance, it is confronting the ‘sovereign frontier’ from the bottom-up by 
bringing CSOs into the wider functions of the state. The method in which the Bank has 
embedded this agenda within state and society enables its continued existence and influence 
upon HIV/AIDS beyond the MAP. The MAP already presents the model of HIV/AIDS 
governance in which the Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria and the UN 
agencies adhere to, yet the permeation of MAP structure to every level of community, state, 
and global governance will ensure the maintenance and expansion of this reform agenda well 
after the end of the project. What we see then is a sophisticated expression of the Bank’s 
reform agenda that addresses the state as a stumbling block to market-led reform by 
appropriating state structures as a means of promoting private service delivery through civil 
society. Addressing the failures of the HIV/AIDS response by looking at state agendas in 
isolation from the international influence depoliticises any understanding of the response to 
the epidemic, and thus reduces the ability to tackle it and its long-wave expression. 
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